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ABSTRACT
Against a background of projections of sharply increasing elderly dependency rates, workers
in the major industrial economies are apprehensive that their social security benefit entitlements will
be cut before or after they retire, leaving them with inadequate retirement income. This paper looks
at recent benefit rule changes in the G7 countries to see what can be learned about such political risk
in PAYG pension systems. From this small sample, I find that projections of rising costs under
current rules are inducing reforms, and that these reforms often have a major impact on the present
discounted value of promised benefits for middle-aged and younger workers. Usually, however, the
benefits of the retired and those nearing retirement are protected. The phasing in of benefit cuts
raises the question as to why younger workers are willing to take significant cuts in their implicit
wealth while protecting the currently old. One possible answer is explored through a simple model:







Issues of risk are, understandably, receiving a lot of attention in the debate over
the relative merits of investment-based (IB) and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security
systems. The risks to retirement income associated with lB systems are well known, and
at least partly offset the attractiveness of their higher expected returns relative to a PAYG
system.2 Yet PAYG systems are not free from risk either. An important source of risk
associated with these more traditional social security systems is commonly referred to as
political risk—defined here to be the risk that benefit rules will be changed through the
political process before or during your retirement, thereby changing the value of
retirement benefits. For the United States, evidence that people perceive such a risk
comes from opinion surveys that show low confidence in the ability of Social Security to
pay them the benefits due to them under current rules, although those surveyed do expect
to receive some benefits (see Reno and Friedland, l997). It is also interesting to note
how the reform debate has been framed in terms of "saving Social Security," especially
after President Clinton's 1998 State of the Union speech, which had saving the program
as its centerpiece. In part, this is an attempt to take make use of risks people perceive
about the sustainability of current rules to spur reform.
Under the social security benefit rules for current retirees, the share of state-
funded pension expenditures in GDP are set to rise as populations in the major industrial
2SeeGeanakopolos et al. (1998) and Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) for different
perspectives on how risk affects the attractiveness of lB systems.
Interestingly, although respondents claimed to have low confidence in Social Security,
they still expressed strong support for the program.
2economies becone older.4 Population aging is most pronounced for Germany and Italy,
where it is projected that there will be one person over 65forevery two people of
working age by 2030, compared to roughly one in four at present. If current high levels
of pension generosity were maintained,5 old age cash benefits would grow to account for
almost one quarter of GDP in both countries. In the other G7 countries, were projected
aging is not as pronounced and/or current pension benefits are less generous, projected
GDP shares are lower, although the increases are still considerable in some cases. These
projections of more costly state pension programs have led to concerns about increased
labor market distortions (including higher unemployment), inadequate national saving
and declining returns on contributions for future generations of workers. Another
possibility, however, is that greater costliness under current rules will lead to changes to
those rules and, unless replacement provision is made, inadequate retirement incomes for
current workers. Indeed, rule changes that reduce future benefits are not just something
that might happen in the future. A number of countries, including Germany and Italy,
have already responded by legislating downward adjustments to future benefit generosity.
While reasonably easy to describe, political risk of this kind is hard to quantify.
The problem is similar to the problem of estimating credit (or default) risk on fixed-
income assets; history is a poor guide to the probabilities and sizes of infrequent discrete
adjustments. Nonetheless, given the importance of political risk to economic
Population aging will become pronounced after about 2010 because of the retirement of
the post-World War H baby boom generation and the fall in fertility rates in recent
decades. Populations are also aging because of increased longevity.
Generosity is defined here as the ratio of the average benefit per elderly person to GDP
per working age person. I elaborate on this in Section 2.
3comparisons of risky retirement income systems and to an understanding of the political
economy of reform, it is important to have at least a sense of what these risksare.6
This paper takes a small step in assessing political risk. To see what can be
learned about the effect on future benefits of the type benefit reforms that have been
pursued in recent years, I examine redefinitions of PAYG benefit rules in the G7
countries from the mid-1980s through the mid-l990s. Until recent decades, rule changes
tended to make systems more generous rather than less. This was possible because
favorable demographics (as baby boom generations entered the labor forces) and the
immaturity of earnings-related pension systems made obligations under existing rules
easily affordable.7 Now that rapid population aging is on the horizon and most systems
are mature, reform efforts are now aimed at curtailing program costs. Recent rule
changes have included increases in retirement ages (especially for women), changing the
way post-retirement benefits are indexed, and increasing the number of.years of earnings
included in the calculation of the initial benefit.8 To gauge the impact of these reforms,
6 Acommon measure of the return (or money's worth) on PAYG contributions is the
ratio of the present discounted value of benefits to the present discounted value of
contributions (see Geanakoplos et al. (1998). From the perspective of a worker at a
particular point in time, there are a number of factors that make this return uncertain. The
worker does not know with certainty his or her subsequent earnings profile, date of
retirement, tax rates, length of life, rules for defining benefits, and so on. For this paper, I
concentrate on the numerator of this return measure—the present discounted value of the
stream of benefits. Moreover, to focus on the effects of changes in benefit rules, I assume
fixed expectations for the earnings profile, retirement date and length of life. The extent
of this political risk depends, then, on the impact of various discrete rule changes on the
stream of benefits and the probabilities of those changes.
Small numbers of people were eligible for full pensions, while the contributor pools
were large. As a consequence, low tax rates could support quite generous state pensions.
8 In thispaper, I concentrate on reforms to the benefits rules of PAYG systems in the 07.
Other major reforms aimed at curbing future tax increases include efforts to pre-fund
future benefit obligations (Canada, Japan, and the United States) and allowing workers to
Continued...
4my approach is to estimate the change in the present discounted value of the benefits an
"average" household can expect to receive—or gross social security wealth (SSW)—as a
result of a reform.
The results from this small sample show that benefit rule changes that
substantially reduce SSW are not unusual responses to projections of sharply rising costs
15 to 30 years into the future. In some cases, the reforms do reduce the SSW of workers
who are already at retirement age, although the sizes of the reductions are typically small.
More often, however, the reforms are phased in so that their main burden does not fall on
the currently retired or those close to retirement. Young and middle-aged workers appear
to be willing to accept large reductions in their gross social security wealth while
protecting the currently old. Assuming the reforms are fully phased in by the time the
worker retires, reductions in SSW of between one quarter and one third have not been
uncommon. For middle-aged workers, this almost certainly means a loss of net social
security wealth as well,9 since they are unlikely to benefit to a great extent from resulting
lower contribution rates given how the benefit cuts are phased in. One possible
explanation for this apparent sacrifice is that these workers see future political risk as
related to the size of future contribution rates. By reducing the burden on future
generations of workers through legislated future benefit cuts (and/or pre-funding through
tax increases as in the U.S.), it might be that they hope to stem even more draconian cuts
later on.
partially opt out of the state system into occupational and personal saving schemes
(United Kingdom).
Net social security wealth is defined as the difference between the present discounted
value of expected benefits less the present discounted value of the expected future social
security taxes (see Feldstein, 1974).
5These calculations show that governments have responded to projections of sharp
increases in dependency rates by curbing future benefit promises. It is not clear, however,
how much of the adjustment to the projected demographic trends have already been
made, and what further adjustments are still to come. A number of factors point to the
likelihood of significant further cuts. First, even with the recent reforms, the costs of
state pension systems are still projected to rise steeply in most countries. Second,
governments have proved willing and able to curb future benefit promises when they
threaten to become too costly—which is probably the main message of this paper. And
third, proposals for additional reforms are being formulated and debated in most
countries.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines how demographics and the
maturing of benefit systems are creating financial problems in industrial country social
security systems, and documents that these looming strains have not significantly reduced
the generosity benefits for current beneficiaries. Section 3 then describes the mainly
forward-looking reforms that have taken place in the I 980s and 1 990s, and estimates their
impact on SSW.InSection 4, I use a simple political economy model to help think about
the puzzle of why self-interested current workers are willing to accept large cuts in their
benefits while protecting the currently old. Section 5concludeswith some comments on
how the response to population aging of cutting PAYG benefits might affect the adequacy
of retirement income in the future, and on the possibility of replacing rather than simply
reducing retirement income using a mandatory lB system.
'°When assessing the overall risk of future benefit rule changes, we must also keep in
mind that, while we are sure that dependency rates will increase sharply over the next 30
years, there is uncertainty about what the exact dependency rates will be.
Continued...
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Section2. Demographic Trends, Pension Generosity and Fiscal Strains
It is well known that under current benefit rules spending on state pensions as a
share of economy will grow dramatically as populations age.' This will impose a heavy
burden on future workers if they are willing to meet this higher cost, in part because of
the expanded distortions brought about by the higher required taxes. If they are not
willing to meet this tax burden, future retirees (that is, current and future workers) are
faced with the prospect of having inadequate retirement incomes. One might expect that
this prospect would lead to a cut in the generosity of current benefits. Such a cut would
free up tax revenues to use to pre-fund future benefits, or at least provide a better return
on the taxes that are paid (for any given future benefits).
Figures la to ig show that there has not been any significant scaling back in the
generosity of benefits during the 1980s and 1990s. The figures use the fact that the cost
rate for state pensions (i.e., the state pension expenditure to GDP ratio) can be
decomposed into the product of the elderly dependency rate and the benefit rate. The
elderly dependency rate that is used is the ratio of the population aged 65orolder to the
population aged between 15 and 64. And the implied benefit rate is then the ratio of the
benefit per elderly person to GDP per working age person.
"
See,for example, OECD (1997) and the papers collected in Bosworth and Burtless.
(1998).
7Expenditure Elderly Population Expenditure/Elderly Population
(2.1) = x
GDP Working Age Population GDP/ Working Age Population
=DependencyRate x Benefit Rate
Care must be taken in interpreting the benefit rate as a measure of generosity. The
denominator in the average benefit expenditure calculation is the number of elderly
(defined as those 65 and over) and not the number of retirees. Of course, people younger
than 65 can be retired and receiving benefits and not all of those over 65areretired. This
broad generosity measure has the advantage, however, that it captures both the ease of
eligibility for benefits (including the ability to access benefits at younger ages) and the
average level of benefits paid to those who are actually retired. To see this, note that that




Retirees Expenditure/Retirees = x
ElderlyPopulation GDP/ Working Age Population
Other things equal, the system will tend to become more generous if there is a trend
toward early retirement12 andlor if the benefits paid to the retired rise relative to income
per working age person.
12 Gruber and Wise (1998) document a strong trend toward early retirement in the
industrialized economies.
8The expnditure data used in the calculations are from the OECD Social
Expenditure (SOCX) database, and include all public old age cash benefits. Survivors'
benefits are not included for these calculations, although I consider them briefly below.
For the United States, to take an example, this comprehensive measure includes
retirement benefits paid by the Social Security and public employee retirement systems,
means-tested benefits paid under Supplemental Security h1come (SSI), and benefits paid
through a number of smaller programs.'3
[Figures la to ig about here]
Over this period, the implied generosity of benefits has been in a range of 20 to 25
percent in Canada, Japan and the United States, a bit more than this in the United
Kingdom, and in a higher range of 35to50 percent in France, Germany and Italy. The
most generous benefits in this sample were recorded in Italy in 1993 at almost 50 percent.
The least generous were in Canada in 1980 at just less than 20 percent. Generosity in
Canada, France and Italy has risen over the period (in the latter two quite sharply), has
been reasonably stable in Germany and Japan, and has fallen in the United States.
13Theseexpenditures are only part of the state expenditures that are set to rise as
populations become older. Another important category of spending that is positively
related to the elderly dependency rate is medical care. Kornai and McHale (1999) present
time series and cross section evidence that the total health spending per person is
positively related to the elderly dependency rate with an elasticity of between 0.1 and 0.2.
They also report regressions that show that the share of total health spending undertaken
by the public sector is positively related to the elderly dependency rate. A one percentage
point increase in the elderly dependency rate is associated with roughly a 3 percentage
point increase in the share of total spending undertaken by the public sector, although the
size of the coefficient is sensitive to specification.
9Generosity endeI up higher in the United Kingdom, following an increase rise in the
implied benefit rate betweenl988 and 1991.'
Thecombination of generosity and demographics led the expenditure to GDP
ratio to drift upwards or remain stable in all countries. The real action, however, is still to
come as post-war baby boomers begin to retire. Table 1 a shows what projected increases
in elderly dependency rates would imply for the cost of old age benefits if 1995 benefit
rates were maintained. (Table lb shows how adding in survivors' benefits changes these
projections.) These mechanically projected trends in this cost rate are quite startling in
some cases. At 1995 levels of generosity, old age benefits account for close to a quarter
of GDP in Germany and Italy. hi France, given somewhat less pronounced aging, these
pensions account still account for more than 17 percent of GDP. The shares in 2030 are
considerably lower in the remaining four countries, primarily because they start with
lower shares; although even for these countries, there is close to a doubling of the share of
the economy devoted to state pensions. Japan is an interesting case because the aging of
its population leads the other countries, but the severity of its problem is still notably less
than the large continental European countries by 203O.'
'Giventhat benefit generosity is usually based on a comparison of benefits with the
wages rather than GDP per working age person, it is helpful for getting an intuitive sense
of the generosity involved to divide the benefit rate by the labor share of GDP. The result
can be interpreted as the ratio of the benefit per elderly person to the wage per working
age person. I calculate this labor share as 1 minus the capital income share as reported by
the OECD (1998). For 1995 the labor shares were: 0.677 for Canada, 0.589 for France,
0.637 for Germany, 0.577 for Italy, 0.682 for Japan, 0.676 for the United Kingdom, and
0.638 for the United States. The implied benefit rates expressed as a percentage of wage
income per working age person were: 36.7% for Canada, 75.7% for France, 7 1.3% for
Germany, 8 1.8% for Italy, 39.4% for Japan, 39.3% for the United Kingdom, and 43.7%
for the United States.
15OECDprojections for Japan after 2030 indicate that the share of state pension
expenditure continues to rise until 2050, reaching about 16 percent of GDP (OECD,
Continued...
10[Table la about here]
[Table lb about here]
These mechanical projections are based on the assumption that the cost rate rises
at the same rate as the elderly dependency rate. To get a better sense of how the cost rate
has varied with the dependency rate across the OECD over the recent past, I used a simple
log-linear OLS regression using a the SOCX data for a pooled sample of OECD countries
for the period 1980 to 1995. The basic regression equation is:
(Exp \ ( Population￿ 65 (2.3) Log) =Constant+/3Log15 ￿Population ￿ 64
The results are reported in Table 2. The coefficient on the demographic variable is highly
significant in the regressions without country dummies.'6 The addition of other potential
determinants of generosity—GDP per capita, the share of the population living in urban
areas and the share of women in the labor force—have little effect on the size or
significance of the demographic variable. The regressions (without country dummies)
show that a 10 percent higher elderly dependency rate is associated with a more than 16
percent higher expenditure to GDP ratio. This non-linear relationship might be explained
1997). For the other G7 countries the OECD projections show a leveling off or even a
fall in this share after about 2040.
11by the increased political influence of the elderly as they grow in numbers—an influence
that is surely set to grow. However, given what this relationship implies about the future
share of total income going to state retirement benefits, it is hard to believe that such a
relationship can persist. For instance, if this relationship were to hold for Italy, the share
of old age cash benefits alone would rise to 36 percent of GDP by 2030! Nonetheless, the
regression results do suggest how difficult a task it will be to hold the growth the
expenditure share below the growth in the elderly dependency ratio.
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
The main focus so far has been on recent trends in state pension spending, and the
future implications for this spending if current levels of generosity are maintained. The
picture of limited reform hides the anticipated impact of already legislated on future
benefits and thereby on future generosity. In the next section, I will attempt to estimate
the impact of these reforms on the social security wealth for certain stylized individuals
and households. Before doing so, it is instructive to look at the projected aggregate
implications of the legislated future changes. This is done in Table 3. For each country
the first line shows the percentage change in the expenditure to GDP ratio for various
years relative the level of that ratio in 1995. The second line shows the OECD
projections of the percentage change in the ratio taking into account changes to benefit
'Withcountry dummies the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level, but size of
Continued...
12rules that have leen already legislated. Caution must be used in interpreting this
comparison since the definitions of state pensions used do not coincide exactly (see the
note to the table). The basic trend is clear, however: already legislated changes appear to
have significantly curbed the future expansion of state pensions as a share of the
economy. What are these legislated changes? And what impact do they have on the
benefits that people can expect to get when they retire? I provide tenative answers to
these questions in the next section.
[Table 3 about here]
Section 3. Recent Reforms, and their Impact on Social Security Wealth
3.1 Assumptions
My goal in this section is to get a sense of the magnitudes of changes to SSW that
have resulted from recent reforms. Of course, a given reform will affect different people
differently, depending on such factors as gender, age, dependents, place in the earnings
distribution, age-earnings profile, and so on.
The approach I adopt is to look at the impact on some "average" households.
Characterizing these individuals requires a number of assumptions, and thus should be
only seen as suggestive of the impact of the reform on workers around the middle of the
earnings distribution. I make six main assumptions:
1. The worker earns the average production wage (as defined by the OECD) at age 4517
thecoefficient on the dependency rate variable is much smaller.
17TheOECD defines an Average Production Worker (APW) as "an adult full-time
production worker in the manufacturing sector whose earnings are equal to the average
Continued...
132. The worker's age-earnings profile is based on that estimated by Mincer (1974)18 using
cross sectional U.S. data.'9 Mincer's cross sectional estimate is combined with
Assumption 1 and data on real earnings/wage growth from the llvIF's International
Financial Statistics (or the World Bank's World Tables for Italy), to produce a
stylized age-earnings profile.20 It is important to have some estimate of the age-
earnings profile, since different countries use different averaging procedures in
assessing relevant lifetime earnings.2'
3. Expected length of retirement (assuming retirement at the standard retirement age) is
based on average life expectancy for workers of given ages at the age at the time of
the reform, and is taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (1996) or
the OECD Health Data (1998).
4. The household is not entitled to any means-tested retirement benefits. This allows us
to concentrate on universal flat-rate benefits and earnings-related benefits. Since I
concentrate on workers earning the average production wage, this is probably realistic
in most cases. Clearly, my estimates are a poor guide to the effect of reforms on low-
earnings of such workers [male and female]" OECD (1995). The values for the wage of
an APW are taken from the OECD publication The Tax/Benefit Position of Production
Workers, various editions.
18 Alsosee Berndt (1991, Chapter 5)
19 The assumed profiles are based on the following equation:
in Earnings =k+ O.O8lAge —000l2Age2.To determine the value of k, the earnings of an
average production worker and an age equal to 45 are substituted into the equation.
Given this value of k, the profile is traced out by varying the age.
20 The realearnings growth is based on actual numbers up to 1996. From 1997 onwards,
real earnings are assumed to grow at a rate of 1 percent per year for all countries.
21 The limitations of this assumption are obvious enough. First, age-earnings profiles
differ between countries, depending, in part, on such institutional features as union
density and deferred compensation arrangements. (See Koike, 1988, for example.)
Second, age-earnings profiles tend to be steeper for high than for low lifetime earners.
Continued.
14income indiyiduals, for whom means-tested benefits are likely to provide a significant
portion of their retirement income.
5. The worker retires at the standard retirement age, and has sufficient years of
contributions to be eligible for full (flat and earnings-related) social security benefits.
The worker is not affected by maximum or minimum limits for earnings-related
pensions.
6. The real discount rate for discounting future benefits is 3 percent.
With these assumptions, I look at the impact of the reforms on the SSW of single
men and women who are 45 at the time of the reform. For the countries where a non-
means-tested dependent spouse allowance is available, I also note the impact on a 45-year
old man with a dependent spouse. In addition, I look at the impact of the same reforms
on men and women at their respective standard retirement ages, again assuming that these
individuals earned the average production wage when aged 45.
3.2 Stylized Benefit Formulas and Their Use in SSW Calculations
Formulas for calculating retirement benefits differ significantly from country to
country. Nonetheless, there are a number of common elements. I will focus on three: the
standard retirement age (R); the calculation of the benefit at the time of retirement; and
the post-retirement indexation of benefits. Of these, the calculation of the initial benefit
is the least straightforward. Following the approach of the OECD (1988), I model the
calculation of the initial benefit as the sum of a flat-rate (lump sum) benefit and an
Indeed, the hump-shaped profile that I assume, tends to be more pronounced for low
income workers.
15earnings-related component. The benchmark benefit equation at the initial retirement age
is,
(3.2.1) B(R) = B1 +/3Ea,
whereB(R) is the benefit at retirement age R, Bf is the flat-rate benefit, fiisthe
replacement rate,22 and E is assessed earnings. E' is some function of the annual
earnings of the various years of the individual's working life. There are two key elements
to this calculation: first, the years that are included; and second, how the earnings are
revalued based on average earnings growth. Other things equal, the greater the weight
given to peak earning years (roughly the worker's fifties given my assumed age-earnings
profile), and the more completely earnings are revalued in line with national earnings
growth (assuming this is positive), the more generous is the benefit formula.
Once the initial benefit is set, I assume that future benefits can be calculated based
on a simple indexation rule. The benefit h years into retirement is given by,
R+h
(3.2.2) B(R + h) = B(R) fJ(i+
22 Theconcept of the replacement rate—i.e., the relevant earnings that are to be
replaced—being used here is thus country specific. Since most countries under study use
earnings over a significant portion of the workers life in the calculation of assessed
earnings, the replacement rate concept is typically close to the fraction of lifetime
earnings that are being replaced. The significant exception is Italy before the 1992
reform, where assessed earnings are based only on the earnings for the five years prior to
retirement.
16where i(t) is the,real indexation factor for year t.Whenbenefits are indexed to consumer
prices, the benefit will be constant in real terms.23 When benefits are indexed to nominal
wages, the benefit will rise at the rate of real wage growth.24
My approach is to calculate gross social security wealth (SSW) for a given benefit
formula viewed from a given age, T, during the worker's life. SSW is the present
discounted value of implied future benefits, evaluated at the given point in the worker's
life. Looked at from this age, SSW is affected by changes in the retirement age, the
benefit formula, and the post-retirement indexation of benefits. (In addition, of course, to
the discount rate for future cash flows and the expected years of retirement.) This
simplified case should give us an idea of the magnitude of wealth changes brought about
by changes in the definition of benefit rules.





This formula calculates SSW based on the simplification that the length of remaining life
in known with certainty, where that length is set equal to the average remaining life for
someone of age T. Of course, a person's remaining life is rarely known with certainty. In
23 From the viewpoint of a givenage during the workers life, the discounted real benefit
falls with the length of the individual's retirement.
24 The real discounted benefit will rise (fall) with the length of the retirement if the real
wage grows at a faster rate (slower rate) than the discount rate.
17Appendix 1, I di,scuss how the certain life-span assumption can lead to a biased estimate
of SSWwhenthe length of remaining life is uncertain.
3.3 Recent Benefit Formula Reforms in the G7 Countries and their Impact on SSW
Overthe last decade and a half or so, six of the seven major industrialized
countries have significantly redefined their retirement benefit formula. The exception is
Canada. Among the six, the reforms I will consider are France (1993), Germany (1992),
Italy (1992), Italy (1995), Japan (1994), United Kingdom (1986), United Kingdom
(1994), and United States (1983).25 These reforms range from the relatively major (e.g.,
Italy (1992) and (1995) and the United Kingdom (1994)) to the relatively minor (e.g.,
Japan (1993) and the United States (1983)).
The stylized benefit formulas prior to the reforms used in the calculations are
outlined in Table 4. Table 5 then outlines the reforms. It is worth noting once again that
only a subset of possible reforms are being focused on; to wit, changes tothe standard
retirement age, the initial benefit formula for a worker earning the average wage with a
full contribution record, and the post-retirement indexation of benefits. For example, the
effects of changes eligibility conditions for a full pension, in the maximum or minimum
pension, in the generosity and eligibility for means-tested benefits, in earlyretirement
25Sincethe mid-1980s, a number of other OECD countries have also reformed their
defined benefit retirement systems. Significant reforms were introduced in Australia
(1992), Austria (1985, 1988, and 1993), Greece (1990 and 1992), Portugal (1993),and
Sweden (1994).
18benefits and corditions, in accrual rates for later retirements, andso on, are not
included.26
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5abouthere]
As can be seen from the first column of Table 5,anumber of countries (Germany,
Italy, Japan [tier 1 benefits], United Kingdom and United States) have raised their
standard retirement age, although typically with a long lead time. There has also beena
tendency for a convergence of the standard retirement ages for men and women
(Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy [Dini reforms]). Thus we will see that women
tend to lose more wealth from the reforms than identically situatedmen.
France, Italy (Amato reforms) and United Kingdom have also significantly
changed the way they assess "average earnings" for their earnings-related pensions. In its
1986 reform, the United Kingdom also reduced its replacement rate from 25percentto 20
percent. The Dini reforms in Italy went even further, by moving from an average
earnings-based method for calculating benefits to a contribution-based method.27 Beyond
its impact on SSW,thisreform has the potential of reducing labor market distortionsby
strengthening the link between contributions made and benefits received, thereby making
contributions seem less like a tax. This reform will have quite differentimpacts on
26 The benefitstreams are calculated before taxes. Since the United States (1983) reform
included a major change in the tax treatment of benefits, I also estimate theimpact on the
stream of net of tax benefits for that reform.
19employees as cojnpared with the self-employed. The reason is that the self-employed
faced lower contribution rates under the old system, so that the shift toa contribution-
based system will hurt them more.
A number of countries have also changed theway they index benefits after
retirement. France and Italy have shifted fromwage indexation to price indexation,
which leads to cumulative benefit cuts over time when realwages are growing. Germany
and Japan (for its tier 2 pensions) have changed fromgross wage indexation to net wage
indexation. Given that contribution rates are expected togrow over time to meet rising
benefit costs, this reform is also a form of benefit cut. Tax rate projectionsare difficult to
make, but given that payroll tax rates must rise substantially (even with recent benefit
reforms) it is important to allow for the slower growth of net realwages in the
calculations. In Germany, the payroll tax is projected to rise from 18.9percent in 1995 to
27 percent in 2030.28 If we assume that the gross realwage rises at an average annual
compound rate of 1 percent, this implies that the net real wage (assuming that non-payroll
taxes remain constant) rises at a rate of 0.7 percent. For Japan, the contribution rate is
projected to rise from 16.5 percent in 1995 to 29.5 percent in 2030.29 if we again assume
1 percent real wage growth (and constant non-payroll taxes), this implies that thenet real
wage rises at the rate 0.5 percent per year over this period.
[Table 6a about here]
27 Sweden is alsomoving toward such a notional defined contribution (NDC) system.
28 Franco and Munzi(1996), based on estimates made by Germany's Social Advisory
Board in 1994.
20Table 6a,contains the estimates of the changes in thepresent value of SSW for
single men and women who are 45 at the time of the reform and are earning theaverage
production wage. I assume that all the reforms are fully phased in by the (new) standard
retirement age. In most cases this is accurate, but in some cases the lead timesare so long
that the reforms are still a long way from being fully phased in(e.g., the Italian and US
reforms). Given the previously noted differential impact on employees and the self-
employed of the second set of Italian reforms, I include separate estimates of the change
in SSW for these two types of worker.
The estimated losses in SSW are substantial, although, as noted above, therange is
quite large. The largest change is for men after 1992 Italian reforms (-38 percent).3°
Other big losses occurred for women in the German, Italian and UK reforms. More
generally, the impact on SSW tends to be especially large when there is a change in the
retirement age and when there is a shift fromwage to price post-retirement indexation.31
Given their longer expected duration of retirement, the impact of the latter reformon
women tends to be greater than the impact of identically situated men. In addition, given
the women in some cases had a lower standard retirementage pre-reform, they have been
disproportionately targeted for standard retirement age increases in Germany and the
29Theseestimates are taken from Takayama (1996).
30MaleItalian employees retiring at the standard retirementage appear to have gained
back some wealth in the 1995 reforms. On the other hand, women and the self-
employed—especially the latter—suffered further loses in this second round of reforms.
Moreover, Hamann (1997) estimates that male employees retiring before 63 are also net
losers.'Bothof these were part of the Italy (1992) reform.
21United Kingdon.32 The German reform led to just a —7.3percent change in SSW for men,
and a —26.2 percent change for women. The corresponding numbers for the1994 reform
in the United Kingdom are -5 percent and -29percent. On the other hand, an equal
increase in the retirement age for men and women tends to hurtmen proportionately
more. The reason is simply that men have shorter life expectancies, so that the lost
benefits represent a larger fraction of the present discounted value of thepre-reform
benefit stream. For example, the increase in the retirementage that took place as part of
the US reform reduces the SSW of men by almost onequarter while reducing the SSW of
women by 16 percent. These estimates are based on average life expectancies fora 45-
year old in the US at the time of the 1983 reform, which were 29 years for men and 34
years for women. If retirement takes place at the standard retirement age (65 prior to the
reform), these life expectancies imply pre-reform expected retirements of 9 and 14years
for men and women respectively. Raising the standard retirementage to 67, and
continuing to assume that retirement takes place at standard retirementage, lowers the
expected retirements by 2 years for both men and women. Given the relatively short
expected retirement for men to begin with, the loss of two years means a largepercentage
cut in the present discounted value of benefits.
Of course, retirement does not always take place at the standard retirementage.
Indeed, Gruber and Wise (1998) document that in many countries most retirements take
place before the standard age, with a large number of people leaving the labor force at the
earliest possible date that they can receive benefits. For a number ofcountries, they also
32Theshift to a contribution-based system with declining coefficients for earlier
retirements in the second Italian reform also disproportionately hurtswomen, given their
earlier retirement age under the older system.
22document significant use of disability and unemployment benefitprograms to finance
early retirement even when state pension benefits are not available. Given this behavior,
it is less clear how raising the standard retirementage affects SSW. For someone who
retirees before the standard retirement age, and continues to retire at thesame age after
the standard retirement age has risen, we need to know how the increase in the standard
retirement age affects the benefits for those taking advantage of early retirement. To take
the US as an example once again, retirement benefits are available asearly as age 62. A
worker availing of early retirement benefits, however, receives just 80percent of the
annual benefit they would have received if they had waited untilage 65. As we have seen
the 1983 reform will eventually increase the standard retirementage to 67, but a worker
will still be allowed to retire at 62 with permanently reduced benefits. The benefit
penalty for early retirement is now 30 percent rather than 20 percent, however. By itself,
this implies a benefit cut (for men and women) of 12.5 percent. Formen in particular,
this is a smaller cut than the close to 25 percent cut (which waspredominantly due to the
increase in the standard retirement age) reported in Table 6a. This demonstrates how the
results are sensitive to the assumption we make about retirement behavior, and the
reported estimates of the impacts of raising standard retirement ages probably reflect the
upper bound of the negative impacts of such reforms.
The second to last column of Table 6a also reports the change in SSWas a fraction
of the APW. This figure gives us another way of gauging the impact of the reformon the
worker. For example, the first number in the column can be interpretedas saying that the
1993 reform of the General Regime in France reduced thepresent discounted value of
future benefits (measured in 1993 money units) by an amount equal to 73percent of the
French APW in 1.993. On this measure, the first of the Italian reforms is shown to have
23been especially evere, reducing SSW (if fully phased in) by more than three times the
APW for both men and women.
[Table 6b about here]
Table 6b contains estimates of the impact of the reforms on those who retired in
the year of the reform at the standard retirementage. With the exception of changes in
the form of post-retirement indexing, all the reforms in Table 5 are phased in, andso do
not affect the initial benefit of newly retired. For the countries that switched fromwage
to price indexation—France and Italy—the estimated loss of SSW is between 6 and 11
percent, which is certainly not insignificant. Under the assumptions for tax increases
discussed above, the shift from gross wage to netwage indexation—Germany and
Japan—leads to cumulative losses of about 2 to 3 percent.
Although the estimates of wealth changes should be seen as indicative only, the
difference between the impacts on middle-aged andyounger workers on the one hand,
and the retired and those close to retirement on the other, is striking. What accounts for
this difference in treatment? One reason is almost certainly that those whoare still some
distance from retirement still have the opportunity to save for retirement, so theyare in a
better position to adjust to the benefit cuts. Yet these adjustments will be painful
nonetheless given the magnitude of wealth loss. Putting aside intergenerational altruism,
why is it that middle-aged workers are willing to make these adjustments instead of
forcing future workers to pay the previously promised benefits? The rhetoric of reform
debates suggests the current workers fear that, with rising dependency ratios,
overburdened future workers will redefine—or even completely eliminate—PAYG
24benefit arrangements. With this in mind, the next section explores asimple model in
which self interested current workers can actually raise their expected benefitsby cutting
the benefits they promise themselves.
Section 4. Repudiation Risk as an Inducement to Early Reform: ASimple Model
The reform case studies produced two main findings about benefit cuts:(i) the
currently retired and those close to retirement are usually spared; and (ii) middle-aged and
younger workers can sometimes face large reductions in their implicit gross SSW. In this
section, I briefly explore one explanation for these findings with a simple model. The
idea behind the model is that workers bear a fixed cost when they cut the benefits of the
old, as well as bearing a (non-linear) cost to paying them benefits. Benefit cuts are
avoided unless benefits reach a level that makes it worthwhile to incur the fixed cost.
Once benefits are cut, the cuts can be large. If current workers believe that the benefits
they are promising themselves will trigger future reform, then it will be in their interests
to preemptively cut their own benefits.
This model relies on the self-interest of current workers to explain whythey cut
their own future benefits. The are of course other reasons to doso, such as a concern for
the fairness of the intergenerational distribution (see Kotlifoff, 1992, for a discussion of
intergenerational accounting) or a concern for economic efficiency (see Feldstein, 1996,
for an overview of the distortions caused by PAYG social security). The costs tocurrent
generations of reducing the unfunded liability of social security are often seen, however,
as a major obstacle to reform. Thus the model suggests how reforms that are considered
good on more impartial grounds might still take place even in a world with quite partial
individuals.
25The model has the following main elements:
• Current workers promise themselves social security benefits to be paid forby future
workers. This is an inherited unfunded liability from the point of view of the future
workers.
• The actual level of benefits is chosen by future workers (say becausethey have a
majority). This represents political risk from the point of view of current workers.
However, future workers face political (or repudiation) costs when they redefine the
benefits that the retired had promised themselves; i.e., when theyrepudiate on part of
the inherited liability. I assume that there is a fixed cost to repudiation and that the
cost of repudiation rises linearly with the size of the benefit reduction. We willsee
that this gives current workers influence over the benefits they will receive.(I take it
that the political costs are sufficiently high to prevent cutting the benefits of the
currently retired. Attention is thus on the decision of current workers about what
benefits to promise themselves.)
• The welfare loss to a future worker of funding benefits rises non-linearly with the
PAYG tax they must pay.
To solve the model, I first determine the optimal choice of benefit reductionby
the second generation of workers for a given level of the inherited unfundedliability.
There will be some maximum level of benefit that they will choose not torepudiate at all.
I show that this level is greater than the level that they would choose if they decideto
repudiate. Given that current workers anticipate the responses of future workers (there is
no uncertainty in the model), it follows that it is optimal for them to promise themselves
benefits at this "maximum" level. If the promised benefits are currently higher than this
level, it is in their interest to scale them back.
26For simpjicity, I assume that there is a single member in the (first)generation of
current workers. Each generation lives for two periods, working in the first and retired in
the second. The population grows at the rate n, so that there are 1 +n workers inthe
second generation. This implies that the dependency ratio, D, in the secondperiod is
equal to1+n
There is a PAYG social security system whereby the workinggeneration is taxed
and the tax revenue is paid out as a benefit to the retired. For a given actual benefit
payment paid to the retired, B( 1), a tax of D x B(1) is levied on each worker to ensure
budget balance.
The current worker knows that a future worker will have utilitygiven by,
(4.1) u =k_T2
— D(F—cAB) with repudiation (i.e., zlB<O)
andu =k— withoutrepudiation (i.e., zlB=O),
whereT the per worker tax, F is the total fixed cost of repudiation, and zIB is thechange
in benefits. Note that the adjustment cost (F —cAB) ismultiplied D (=1/(1+n)) to put it
in per worker terms. Writing the benefit as the sum of the inherited unfundedliability,
B(O), and the change in that benefit, the constraint faced by the future worker is
(4.2) T=DB(1)=D(B(O) +
27Assuming that the future worker does repudiate, I can find what the optimal repudiation
will be by substituting the budget balancing constraint into theutility function and
maximizing with respect to zIB. The optimal change in the benefit is,
C
(4.3) AB=——B(O), aD
so that the actual benefit paid is
C
(4.4) B(1)=—.aD
The next step is to find out when the future generation will in factrepudiate. I
assume that repudiation will take place if it increases utility (taking into account, of
course, the costs of repudiation). The repudiation condition is then,
1c2 a
repudiate if:k + — DF—cDB(O)>k
—D2B(O)2,
2lc
where I assume that ——— DF<0 (which implies that future workers have higher utility 2a
by not repudiating when the unfunded liability that they face is very low, as can be seen in
Figure 1).
28I now turn attention to the current worker's choice of unfunded liability toplace
on the future worker. The current worker wants this to be as large as possible, so chooses
the largest B(O) that is consistent with no repudiation. This can be found byreplacing the
inequality in the repudiation constraint with an equality and solving the resulting cfcf quadraticfor B(O). The roots of this equation are:+ and — Given
1 c2
thatI have assumed that —DF<0, the first root is positive and the second is





That is, the benefit is equal to the repudiation benefit plus a premium that isnegatively
related to the dependency ratio. The determination of the maximum future benefit
consistent with no repudiation is shown graphically in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
The optimal benefit increases with c and F, and decreases with a and D. Smaller
repudiation costs or more distorting taxes will lower the feasible benefit for a given
dependency ratio. Most importantly, an increase in the future dependency ratio, D, will
cause current workers to cut the benefits they promise themselves.
29Figure 4 shows how the actual benefits paid, B(1), correspond to the promised
benefits, B(O). The two rise together until the repudiation threshold is reached at cf + Atthat level of the unfunded liability, repudiation occurs, and actual
C
benefitsfall to .Thisis a rather extreme form of debt "laffer curve" (as discussed in aD
Krugman, 1989 [1993]). Debt "forgiveness" in the sense of voluntary reducing the
unfunded liability on the next generation can actually raise the benefits received,making
both generations better off. The earlier generation receives higher benefits, and the latter
generation avoids the unpleasantness of cutting redefining benefits for the old.
[Figure 4 about here]
We can use the PAYG budget constraint to see how the tax rate changes with the
dependency rate,
cI2FD
(4.6) T =DB(1)=— + .ja ya
Given our assumptions, current workers know that future workers will be willing
to bear part of the burden of an increase in the dependency ratio with higher tax rates.
The marginal willingness of future workers to share the burden, however, decreases with
the dependency ratio. In other words, when the dependency ratio (and thus the tax rate) is
already high, their willingness to increase the tax rate further in response to an even
higher dependency ratio is low.
30In conchjsion, this simple model produces three main results that are not
inconsistent with recent reforms. First, repudiation on retirement benefit obligations to
the currently retired should not take place even when the dependency rate ishigh
(assuming that this high rate was anticipated). Second, benefit promises should be
reformed in anticipation of the high dependency ratio to prevent costly repudiations. And
third, an anticipated increase in the dependency rate should lead ultimately to a mix of
lower benefits and higher taxes.
Section 5.ConcludingComments
This paper has shown that in response to projections of sharply rising costs of
state-provided retirement income, governments have succeeded in legislating significant
cuts in future benefits. In most cases, these cuts have not been enough to stabilize the
share of GDP being spent by governments on retirement benefits, so it isreasonably safe
to predict more benefit cuts if this approach to "saving" social securityprograms
continues to be pursued. Although this paper has focused on attempts to scale back
PAYG programs, I conclude with some comments on the alternatives to thisapproach to
curbing the cost to future taxpayers.
There are two main competing approaches:33 (i) pre-fund (using current taxes)
future defined-benefit obligations; or (ii) substitute privately pre-funded defined-
contribution (DC) accounts for these obligations—the lB option. What these approaches
have in common is that they force current workers to pay for themselves what future
workers were to have paid for. This is clear with the pre-funding of existing obligations,
I ignore large-scale cuts in benefits to the currently or soon to be retired as an option.
31but a bit obscured under the privatization option. For the US, where privatization has
received a lot of attention, there appear to be two approaches to moving to an lBsystem.
The substitution element is clearest is proposals to increase the payroll tax (oruse the
budget surplus) to fund accounts from which the proceeds would replace an increasing
proportion PAYG benefits over time.34 The increase in the tax is temporary, as the
amount need to fund existing DB obligations declines over time as these obligations are
replaced by the proceeds from the DC accounts. The alternative approach is to shift some
or all payroll taxes into the funding of private DC accounts and to fund remaining PAYG
obligations with a combination of government debt and increases in payroll and non-
payroll taxes (such as a consumption tax).35 How much of the burden falls on current
workers depends on the split between tax increases and debt finance.36
What I have stressed so far is how these reforms all place a burden on current
workers to partly relieve the burden on future workers. One important difference between
the cut future benefits and substitute current funding approaches might their effectson the
adequacy of future retirement income. It is possible that current workers will respond to
large cuts in the benefits they are promised by raising their private saving, thereby
maintaining their living standards (without having to work longer) in later life. But it
seems unwise to rely on this. In the countries where future benefits rules have already
been reformed substantially, do younger workers even know how much the benefits that
See, for example, Feldstein and Samwick (1998)
For a proposal of this type, see Kotlikoff and Sachs (1997).
36current taxes are not raised at all, then future tax-payers are not being helped. Instead
of having to meet unfunded social security obligations they will have to meetgovernment
debt obligations. Thinking in terms of the model of Section 4, however, there might a
difference in the willingness to repudiate on social security obligations and the
Continued.
32they should be anticipating have fallen? The advantage of pre-funding is that an
alternative (albeit potentially uncertain) source of retirement income isput in place
directly.
This brings back to where I started and the fact that there is risk in both lB and
PAYG systems. Although there are different ways to characterize the risk,one aspect is
the possibility of having inadequate income in retirement. The main finding of thispaper
is that politically imposed changes in PAYG benefit rules that have alarge impact on the
flow of benefits in retirement are not just a possibility—they have already occurred ina
number of major economies. And given that costs are still set to escalatesubstantially, it
is almost certain that more are in store. The decision about partially or fullysubstituting
an lB for a PAYG system depends, of course, on more than just risk factors (notably the
impacts on economic efficiency and inter- and intra-generational distribution). In
considering reform options, however, the vulnerability of existing PAYG defined benefit
rules needs to be kept in mind.
willingness to repudiate on government debt. Thus this form of asset swap could still
benefit existing workers.
33Appendix 1 A Note on the Bias Induced by the Certain Length of Life Assumption
How serious a limitation is the assumption of a certain remaining lifetime? In
general, the expected SSW of someone with an uncertain remaining lifetime with an
expected duration of R-T+H years is not the same as the as the SSW of someone with a
certain remaining lifetime of that length. The two are equal under thefollowing
restrictive conditions: (i) the real discounted annual benefit is constantover time (this
requires that real benefits grow at a rate equal to the real discount rate); and (ii) the
worker is certain to reach retirement age.
The first assumption implies that SSW is a linear function of the length of
retirement. If the worker is certain to reach the retirementage, but the discounted real
benefit falls over time, so that SSW rises at a decreasing rate with the length of retirement,
then SSW will be lower under the uncertain lifetime assumption.37 In other words, the
estimate of SSW based on the certain remaining lifetime assumption is biasedupward.
On the other hand, if the discounted real benefit rises over time (which will be thecase if
benefits grow at a faster rate than the discount rate), then the estimate is biased
downward.
[Figure 5 about here]
The reasoning here is similar to that which shows that expected utility is less than the
utility of the expected income for a risk averse individual. A risk-averse individual has
diminishing marginal utility in income. In the case considered here, the individual has
diminishing marginal SSW in the number of years of retirement. Given this and assuming
Continued,
34A further complication is added if there is a positive probability of not surviving
until retirement age. A simple example of with a linear SSW schedule is shown in Figure
5. Given the constant discounted real benefit, SSW is higher under the uncertain lifetime
assumption. The worker will live to A0 with probability p or A1 with probability l-p,
which I assume leads her to expect to live until R+H. Note that A0 is less than R so there
is a positive probability of not reaching retirement age. The expected SSW given the
uncertain length of life is SSW4, which is a probability weighted average of the zero
benefits that are received if the worker does not survive until retirement and the present
discounted value of benefits if she survives until A1. Inspection of the diagram reveals
that this level of SSW is greater than the SSW of someone who is certain of dying at age
R+H (SSW in the diagram above).38 Thus the possibility of dying before retirement tends
to bias the estimate of social security wealth upwards. Our primary concern, however, is
with the percentage change in social wealth that results from a benefit reform rather than
with the actual levels of wealth, and there is some reason to hope that the bias is smaller
less for this calculation. In the case of a linear SSW schedule, for example, a change in
the individual is certain to reach retirement, then the expected SSW is less than the SSW at
expected remaining length of life.
It is easy to demonstrate that substituting the expected length of life, R+H =pA0 +(1-
p) A1, into the equation for the dashed upward sloping line linking the points (A0, 0) and
(Aj, SS W(A1)), yields a level of SSW equal to SSWU. Thus a graphical comparison shows
that, with a linear SSW schedule, a positive probability of early death means that expected
SSW is greater than the SSW at the expected lifetime. That is, the latter is a downward
biased estimate of expected SSW. Of course, if the marginal social security wealth is
diminishing with the length of the retirement, it is still possible that SSW at the expected
lifetime is upward biased.
35the level of the (,.constant) discounted real benefit level will lead to an equal percentage
changes in SSW under the certain and uncertain lifetime assumptions.39
Summing up, the assumption of the fixed remaining length of life assumption
does introduce a potential bias in estimates of SSW. It is not obvious, however, which
way the bias goes. A positive probability of not reaching retirement leads to a downward
bias, while the likelihood that the real benefit growth rate is less than the discount rate
(which is assumed to be 3 percent for the calculations in the paper) leads to an upward
bias. Finally, if the benefit growth rate and the discount rate are reasonably close, there is
reason to hope that biases in the percentage change calculations that are the focus of the
paper are less serious.
Let b be the initial discounted value of the social security benefit for all periods after
retirement, and b* be the benefit after reform. For a retirement with acertain length of H,
the relative change in SSW is equal to the relative change in the benefit,
b
Foran
uncertain retirement of length H, and with a positive probability of dying at the pre-




( = . Thus,even though making the lifetime _______
b
Ai-k )
uncertain raises the social security wealth for a given benefit level and expected life-span,
Continued..
36the relative change in wealth that results from a change in the benefit level is, under our
special assumptions, the same in each case.
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Total Public Expenditure on Old Age Cash Benefits
Assuming Benefit Rate (Average Benefit I GDP per Working Age Person) at 1995 level
OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Data Base (all public programs)
1995 2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada
Dependency Rate 17.7 18.2 20.4 28.4 39.1
Benefit Rate 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 4.3 4.5 5.0 6.9 9.6
France
Dependency Rate 23.2 23.6 24.6 32.3 39.1
Benefit Rate 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 10.4 10.5 11.0 14.4 17.4
Germany
Dependency Rate 22.7 23.8 30.3 35.4 49.2
Benefit Rate 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4
ExpendituretoGDPRatio 10.3 10.8 13.8 16.1 22.3
Italy
Dependency Rate 23.3 26.5 31.2 37.5 48.3
Benefit Rate 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2
ExpendituretoGDPRatio 11.0 12.5 14.7 17.7 22.8
Japan
Dependency Rate 20.4 24.3 33.0 43.0 44.5
Benefit Rate 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 5.5 6.5 8.9 11.6 12.0
United Kingdom
Dependency Rate 24.3 24.4 25.8 31.2 38.7
Benefit Rate 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 6.5 6.5 6.9 8.3 10.3
United States I
World Bank Demographic Projections
Dependency Rate 19.2 19.0 20.4 27.6 36.8
Benefit Rate 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 5.4 5.3 5.7 7.7 10.3
United States II
Social Secuity Administration Demographic Projections
Dependency Rate 19.2 18.7 19.1 24.8 31.9
Benefit Rate (1995) 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 5.4 5.2 5.3 6.9 8.9
Note: Expenditure to GDP Ratio =[(DependencyRate)(Benefit Rate)]/100
Sources: OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Data Base; OECD (1997); and Bosworth et al. (1998).Table lb.
Total Public Expenditure on Old Age and Survivors Benefits
Assuming Benefit Rate (Average Benefit I GDP per Working Age Person) at 1995 level
OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Data Base (all public programs)
1995 2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada
Dependency Rate 17.7 18.2 20.4 28.4 39.1
Benefit Rate 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 4.8 5.0 5.6 7.7 10.6
France
Dependency Rate 23.2 23.6 24.6 32.3 39.1
Benefit Rate 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 12.2 12.4 12.9 17.0 20.6
Germany
Dependency Rate 22.7 23.8 30.3 35.4 49.2
Benefit Rate 47.9 47.9 47.9 47.9 47.9
ExpendituretoGDPRatio 10.9 11.4 14.5 17.0 23.6
Italy
Dependency Rate 23.3 26.5 31.2 37.5 48.3
Benefit Rate 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 13.7 15.6 18.3 22.0 28.3
Japan
Dependency Rate 20.4 24.3 33.0 43.0 44.5
Benefit Rate 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 6.3 7.5 10.1 13.2 13.7
United Kingdom
Dependency Rate 24.3 24.4 25.8 31.2 38.7
Benefit Rate 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 7.3 7.3 7.7 9.3 11.6
United States I
World Bank Demographic Projections
Dependency Rate 19.2 19.0 20.4 27.6 36.8
Benefit Rate 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9
ExpendituretoGDPRatio 6.3 6.2 6.7 9.1 12.1
United States II
Social Secuily Administration Demographic Projections
Dependency Rate 19.2 18.7 19.1 24.8 31.9
Benefit Rate (1995) 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9
Expenditure to GDP Ratio 6.3 6.2 6.3 8.2 10.5
Note: Expenditure to GDP Ratio =[(DependencyRate)(Benefit Rate)]/100
Sources: OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Data Base; OECD (1997); and Bosworth et al. (1998).Table 2.
Pooled OLS Regression for State Pension Expenditure as a Share of GDP
OECD Countries, 1980-1995
Dependent Variable Log(Pension Expenditure/GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Variables:
Log(Elderly Dependency Rate) 1.64 1.63 1.63 1.64 0.20
(24.94) (19.57) (19.23) (24.50) (1.98)








Constant -3.10 -3.14 -3.85 -3.16 1.07
Adjusted R-Squared 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.96
No. of Observations 343 343 343 343 343













Figure 2. Aging and Public Pension Spending
OECD Countries, 1980 - 1995
Regression Line:
Pension ExpJGDP=0.045(Dependency Rate)164
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Elderly Dependency RateTable 3.
OECD Estimates of the Impact of Legislated Reforms
Percentage Change in Expenditure to GDP Ratios Relative to 1995 Ratio
Canada
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
France
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
Germany
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
Italy
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
Japan
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
United Kingdom
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
United States
Assuming Constant 1995 Benefit Rate (From Table 1)
OECD Estimates Given the Impact of Legislated Reforms
Note:
2000 2010 2020 2030
% Change
2.6 14.9 60.0 120.3
-3.8 1.9 32.7 73.1
1.6 5.9 39.1 68.4
-7.5 -8.5 9.4 27.4
10.9 41.1 64.9 129.2
3.6 6.3 10.8 48.6
13.9 34.1 61.1 107.5
-5.3 -0.8 15.0 52.6
19.2 61.9 110.9 118.3
13.6 45.5 87.9 103.0
0.3 6.1 28.3 59.1
0.0 15.6 13.3 22.2
-1.2 6.1 43.5 91.4
2.4 9.8 26.8 61.0
The measure of pension expendiuture used in OECD (1997) for their estimates does not exactly match the measure
based on all state old age cash expendiutures from the OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) database used in Table 1.
Thus the comparision of percentage changes with and without legislated reforms should be seen as indicative only.
Both sets of estimates are based on the World Bank demographic projections.





































































































































Assuming full eligibility for an earnings-related pension.
2Mostof the population are covered by a two-pillared system comprising of the Regime
General and a complementary scheme organized on a socio-professional basis. Analysis
of the french system is complicated by a number of regime speciaux, which substitute for
the regime general for some workers. The 1993 reform was limited to the regime general
and some related schemes, so I concentrate on that plan here.
The formal retirement age for Tier 2 benefits is 65, but workers can retire at 60 without
loss of benefits (see Takayama, 1996).












































Sources: Disney (1996), Franco and Munzi (1996), Hamann [IMFI (1997), Leibfritz et al. [OECDI (1995),
OECD (1988), Takayama (1996), U.S. Social Security Administration (Various Years)





































































































































'Assuming full eligibility for an earnings-related pension.
2Mostof the population are covered by a two-pillared system comprising of the Regime
General and a complementary scheme organized on a socio-professional basis. Analysis
of the french system is complicated by a number of regime speciaux, which substitute for
the regime general for some workers. The 1993 reform was limited to the regime general
and some related schemes, so I concentrate on that plan here.
The formal retirement age for Tier 2 benefits is 65, but workers can retire at 60 without
loss of benefits (see Takayama, 1996).












































Sources: Disney (1996), Franco and Munzi (1996), Hamann [IMF] (1997), Leibfritz et al. OECD] (1995),
OECD (1988), Takayama (1996), U.S. Social Security Administration (Various Years)











































































equal to 6.1% of
capitalized
contributions.
1 Inaddition, the number of years required for a full pension is to be gradually raised
from 37 1/2 years to 40 years.
2Infact, pensions had been indexed to prices since 1987, with wage indexation being
suspended on a yearly basis. The reform institutionalized the new indexation procedure.
Other reforms not included here include: more strict rules on early retirement, reduced
pension credits for years in higher education, and increases in pensions for low wage
workers.
Since employees pay a higher contribution rate than the self employed, the shift from
average earnings-based benefits to contributions-based benefits means that the reform has
a more negative impact on the self-employed. Employees currently face a contribution
rate of 32 percent, as compared to a 15% rate for the self employed. In fact, the benefits
are calculated using "notional" contribution rates of 33 and 20 percent for employees and
the self employed respectively. Thus, even though the self-employed take a bigger hit
from the change of system, they continue to receive a subsidy (see Hamann, 1997).. life, revalued
at the growth























































5For those retiring at 60, the coefficient is 5.1 percent. The earliest allowable retirement
age is 57,atwhich the coefficient drops to 4.7 percent (Hamann, 1997). The stated
intention is that these coefficients will be periodically adjusted downwards in response to
lengthening life expectancy.
6Otherreforms of the earnings related pension (SERPS) include a reduction of the
survivor's pension from 100 percent to 50 percent of the pension that was to be paid to
the deceased contributor and an extension of arrangements for contracting out of
earnings-related pensions.
The lower earnings limit (LEL) is set equal to the flat-rate basic benefit, and is thus
adjusted only for price inflation. When real wage growth is positive, this seemingly























Sources: Disney (1996), Franco and Munzi (1996), Hamann [IMF] (1997), Leibfritz et al. [OECD] (1995),
OECD (1988), Takayama (1996), U.S. Social Security Administration (Various Years)
8 Otherreforms not treated here include increased taxation of benefits, expansion of the
program toinclude new federal employees, and a small payroll tax increase.
If a taxpayer's combination of adjusted gross income, interest on tax exempt bonds, and
50percentof Social Security benefits exceeds certain threshold amounts, benefits equal
to the lesser of 50percentof benefits or 50percentof combined income over the
threshold amount is subject to income tax. The additional revenue is added to the trust
funds. The taxation of benefits was further modified in 1993, when a secondary (higher)
threshold was introduced. An amount equal to 85percentof combined income over the
secondary threshold is now added to the benefits that are subject to income tax. The
additional tax revenues are added to the Medicare health insurance trust fund.Table 6a. Impact of Selected Benefit Reforms on Social Security Wealth (SSW)
45 year old woiker earning the average production wage























































Men (retiring at 65)
Employee
Self Employed





































Men6 229% 177% -52% -22.8%
The post-reform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement
age is fully phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement
age for women (to 65 from 60) is not due to be fully phased in until 2018, these
calculations overstate the effect on a worker who is 45 at the time of the reform.
2 This reform will affectemployees and the self employed very differently, so the effects
on the SSW of these different types of workers are included separately. The reason for
the differential effects is that the self employed pay a much low contribution rate than
employees. Thus a shift to contribution-based benefits has a larger negative impact on
the implicit wealth of this group.
Post reform calculations are based on a real GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent
These calculations are made on the assumption that the worker retires at age 60, but
after the reform does not receive tier- 1 benefits until aged 65. If the reform leads
retirement to be postponed until aged 65, then the benefit losses are larger. Under this
assumption, the benefit losses for men and women are 34.9 and 28.7 percent respectively.
A married man with a dependent spouse received benefits with a present value equal to
502 percent of the APW before the reform and equal to 411 percent after the reform (a
18.1 percent reduction in SSW).Women7
£9118
£9118



























6 Amarried man with a dependent spouse received benefits with a present value equal to
288 percent of the APW before the reform and equal to 236 percent after the reform (a
18.2 percent reduction in SSW).
The post-reform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement
age is fully phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement
age for women (to 65 from 60) is not due to be fully phased in until 2020, these
calculations overstate the effect on a worker who is 45 at the time of the reform.
8Amarried man with a dependent spouse received benefits with a present value equal to
267 percent of the APW before the reform and equal to 258 percent after the reform (a 3
percent reduction in SSW).
Thepost-reform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement
age is fully phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement
age to 67 is not due to be fully phased (for a worker reaching the early retirement age of
62) until 2022, these calculations overstate the effect on a worker who is 45 at the time of
the reform.
10Amarried man with a dependent spouse received benefits with a present value equal to
224 percent of the APW before the reform and equal to 196 percent after the reform (a
20.0 percent reduction in SSW).
"If the income of the retiree is high enough so that the 50 percent of benefits are now
subject to income taxation, then the loss of SSW rises to 30.2 percent.
12Ifthe income of the income of the retiree is high enough so that the 50 percent of
benefits are now subject to income taxation, then the loss of SSW rises to 22.3 percent.Table 6b. Impact of Selected Benefit Reforms on Social Security Wealth (SSW)
Worker at standard retirement age who earned the average production wage at 45













Gross wage indexation —>Net
wage indexation (assuming gross
real wage growth of 1 percent and





















Gross wage indexation —Net
wage indexation (assuming gross
real wage growth of 1 percent and





















Six month cost of living
adjustment freeze (assuming
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